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The Complicity of the Ethical
Causality, Karma, and Violence in Buddhism and 
Levinas
Eric S. Nelson
Greek wisdom, therefore, is an opening, but it is also the possi-
bility of speaking through signs which are not universally under-
stood and which, as signs of complicity, thus have the power to 
betray.
— Emmanuel Levinas, Beyond the Verse
Ethics is no longer a simple moralism of rules decreed by the 
virtuous. It is the original awakening of an “I” responsible for 
others, the accession of my person to the uniqueness of the “I” 
called and elected to responsibility for others.
— Emmanuel Levinas, Unforeseen History
Beyond the specific questionability of Greek philosophy for Emman-
uel Levinas, and despite Socrates’s testimony in the Apology that 
human wisdom is worth little or nothing in contrast with a divine 
wisdom that no mortals possess, there is a sense in which all wisdom is 
betrayal. Wisdom, even the most compassionate and pacifistic, can be 
complicit with injustice and violence and excuse suffering.1 Yet, even 
as wisdom and communication can betray individuals and human-
ity, they potentially interrupt such complicity by indicating some-
thing other than betrayal in the midst of its power. The realities of 
war and exploitation, and the impossibility of the moral purity and 
fidelity of the virtuous and the wise, are not the conclusion but the 
point of departure for ethics according to Levinas in his preface to 
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Totality and Infinity. After the moralism of the righteous self, which 
abandons others to the imperfections of the world, there remains the 
possibility of awakening to the other in the ethical encounter. This 
ethical event, prior to the universal ethical reflection of the moral-
ists and the prudential judgment of the virtuous, is the betrayal and 
complicity of the self who is implicated and thus must answer to the 
other in some way.
This contribution is an investigation of the intersections and ten-
sions between morality and complicity, or ethics and causality, in 
Levinas and Buddhism with the aim of interrogating the possibility 
of a phenomenology of the ethical that neither brackets immanent, 
worldly, causal conditioning nor forgets it by transcending or excus-
ing it.2 The transcendent ethical moment that interrupts the relentless 
economy of the real is not simply a negation of immanence in the 
utopia, idealism, or other-worldliness critiqued by thinkers of radical 
immanence from Friedrich Nietzsche to Gilles Deleuze. Ethical inter-
polation occurs and is significant only in the context of the unethi-
cal, the earthly suffering that afflicts embodied sensibility in hunger 
and thirst, violence and war, birth, sickness, aging, and death. The 
ethical address happening within the midst of — and in antagonism 
with — the violence of being’s immanence provokes the difficult task 
of responding to the other and of self-transformation.
I. Phenomenology, BuddhIsm, and the QuestIon of CausalIty
Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method is frequently por-
trayed as beginning with the bracketing of the natural attitude of 
conventional, everyday life and the naturalistic causal-explanatory per-
spective of the sciences. Husserl placed causal explanation and causal 
conditioning out of play, whether it is naturalistic or historicist, for a 
realm of “motivated rationality.”3 In contrast with a hypothetically 
explained, causally constituted world, consciousness arrives through 
the bracketing of the epoché at its own constitutive powers and free-
dom in relation to things. The phenomenological method leads to the 
discovery of the spontaneity of intentionality as well as its indebtedness 
to its objects, as consciousness is inevitably  intentional  consciousness 
of one thing or another. As this consciousness is not only active but 
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also passive, phenomenology lives in the tension between the poles 
of a transcendental — if not transcendent — freedom and the condi-
tions of being embodied in and affected by an environing world of 
objects. Through bodily life in an environing world, phenomenology 
is exposed to the passivity involved in all synthesis and to the receptiv-
ity to a historical situation through which consciousness must pro-
ceed. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty remarked, phenomenology not only 
concerns ideal essences and the priority of consciousness, but it “is 
also a philosophy which places essences back into existence, and does 
not expect to arrive at an understanding of humans and the world 
from any starting point other than that of their ‘facticity.’ ”4
The phenomenological confrontation with facticity provokes the 
question of whether or not there can be a phenomenology of factic-
ity and how this should be understood. For instance, should facticity 
primarily be understood ontologically or ethically? In the cases of 
Heidegger and Levinas, the world and the other interrupt their being 
put out of play, placing the priority of consciousness and its freedom 
into question. Despite their departures from transcendental phenom-
enology, neither philosopher returns to the naturalistic standpoint 
and its causally conditioned world. The phenomenology of facticity 
does not become one of causality. Perhaps this is because analyzing 
reality into a causal series, associated with a third-person perspective, 
is irreconcilable with the first- and second-person perspective of I 
and you associated with — despite their differences — transcendental, 
ontological, and ethical phenomenology.5
If phenomenological bracketing cannot return to the priority of 
causality, is it incompatible with Buddhism insofar as the Buddha 
is said to initiate his diagnosis with the very facticity of causal con-
ditioning and its associated suffering? This raises two concerns: 
first, even if the Dharma promises — analogously to the freedom 
of consciousness described by Husserl — the ultimate reduction of 
causality in liberation, “the ultimate elimination of habit (karma) 
altogether,” as phenomenological readings of Buddhist texts sug-
gest, Buddhist thinkers of various traditions consistently warn of 
disregarding causal  conditioning.6 Karma as a causal order is the 
source of enslavement, yet it is at the same time the means and site 
of awakening through dharmic practices. Not recognizing the self ’s 
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worldly independence is itself a sign of the self ’s delusion about itself. 
Secondly, Buddhism — from Abhidharma and Yogācāra to Chan 
(禪, Jp. Zen) — has been depicted as phenomenological in unfold-
ing rich, descriptive portrayals of experience and their dynamics as 
part of its diagnostic and therapeutic approach to human suffering. 
However, one can likewise ask in this case if the Buddhist exploration 
of phenomenological first-person personal experience arrives at the 
phenomenological subject — or is the first-person perspective itself 
something ultimately to be abandoned in the course of awakening 
like the raft that brings one to the other shore? To this extent, the 
Buddhist deconstruction of the self to its causal aggregates — its con-
tingent, impersonal, and plural conditions — evokes the skepticism 
of David Hume or Nietzsche rather than Husserl’s transcendental 
ego or the radically reconceptualized worldly and embodied self of 
Heidegger’s Dasein or Merleau-Ponty’s flesh.7
If the intercultural conjunction of phenomenology and Buddhism 
is problematic, the comparison of Buddhism and Levinas entails 
further complexities of distance and, more provocatively, affinity. 
Levinas’s ethics of the priority of the other over the self has been 
repeatedly compared with the complete altruism and saintliness of 
the bodhisattva.8 Gillian Rose, Slavoj Žižek, and others have used this 
resonance to criticize Levinas’s philosophy as a “Buddhist Judaism” 
that posits an absurdly impossible ethical ideal and entails disastrous 
political consequences.9 Levinasian and Buddhist ethics are, accord-
ing to Žižek, excessively demanding and moralistic, naïve and unre-
alistic, and thereby open to endless cynical uses and maneuvers.10 
Levinas is interpreted by Rose and Žižek as radically emphasizing 
the absoluteness of ethical alterity and transcendence at the expense 
of indifference to real suffering. This critique is unfair, particularly 
since Levinas frequently focuses attention in his writings on concrete 
social and political issues such as wealth, labor, and poverty at the 
local and global levels. It nevertheless raises significant philosophi-
cal issues; does Levinas’s ethics naively bracket and transcend the 
realities in which moral dramas are played out? Does he, following 
Husserl’s phenomenological method, bracket causality and causal 
 interdependence for pure experience and ideation? That is, is Levinas 
not an appropriate target of critique by the new materialism to the 
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extent that he is offering a phenomenological monadology of the 
other, or even a theological noumenology of the invisible, rather than 
dependent, conditional causal interaction with worldly others?11
II. BuddhIsm, levInas, and the ImPossIBle PossIBIlIty of ethICs
In contrast to this argument that they are unreasonably idealistic 
and moralistic, Buddhism and Levinas are remarkably attentive to 
the pragmatic and realistic dimensions of human existence. Trauma, 
violence, war, and delusion are not ignored but instead call forth a 
response and initiate practical description, analysis, and diagnosis. 
Although an altruistic ethics of perfected compassionate beings is in 
some sense exemplary in Buddhism, it engages in practice in descrip-
tions, diagnoses, and meditative therapies concerning the causal con-
ditioning, the suffering and violence, and the worldly complicity of 
embodied agents. Likewise, the ethical is not isolated in Levinas as a 
moralistic ideal separate from the processes of exchange, commerce, 
and business or from the realities of violence and suffering.12
As a thinker addressing the ethical in the course and wake of two 
world wars and the Holocaust, Levinas does not simply or moralisti-
cally dream of perpetual peace but instead describes how “war sus-
pends morality” and is the greatest ordeal “of which morality lives” 
(TI 21). The traumatism of the ethical, of the interruption of the 
solidity and sufficiency of the self by the agony and pain of the other, 
is only thinkable in the context of destitution and betrayal. Levinas, 
accordingly, considers an ethical saying that is “made without com-
promise, and without a secret betrayal,” while being unable to evade 
the betrayal of and indiscretion in relation to what is said (IR 257; 
BPW 7, 113). In Levinas and Buddhism, the ethical is articulated in the 
context of its impossibility — that is, of the non- and  antiethical — in 
conditionality and causality.13
Levinas’s thought has an ethical force, without principles and pre-
scriptions, and suggests an imprudent goodness without certainties. 
The force of the ethical is constituted by and bound to the fragility 
and failures of ethics in everyday life rather than being refuted by 
them.14 Although Diane Perpich argues that the face should not be 
interpreted causally, its irreducibility is still related to the  fragility and 
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conditionality of actual faces that are causally and materially affected. 
The transcendence of the face that reveals the command, “Thou 
shalt not kill” is bound to a face that is harmed, suffers, and is killed. 
If the face suffers, and is not an isolated monad unaffected by the 
violence done to it, then the linkage between the ethical and the 
causal, between transcendence and immanence, cannot be bracketed 
or suspended. The conditionality, complicity, and materiality of the 
self — a self that is riveted to the facticity of its bodily life that betrays 
it to violence (OE 52–53) — is articulated throughout Levinas’s 
works, nowhere more powerfully than in his reflections on National 
Socialism and the Shoah, and on violence and war. Instead of naïvely 
asserting the priority of the ethical out of neglect of worldly affairs, 
Levinas begins the preface to Totality and Infinity by interrogating 
its very possibility in the context of war, violence, and the strategic 
assertion of the will in its struggle to survive.
War is, according to Levinas, “the truth of the real” and “the pure 
experience of pure being” (TI 21). Similarly, in initial response to 
the rise of Nazism, Levinas explored a decade earlier the brutality 
and fatality of the fact and there-ness of being pinned to the factic-
ity of bodily being, blocking anyone from being free and at ease in 
the world, as well as blocking all means of escape (OE 51, 59; UH 
20). The self-sufficiency and there-ness of being is seen as a kind 
of brutality, as freedom and dignity are assaulted by the brutal fact 
of being, a nonappropriable oppressive presence without refuge or 
escape (OE 49, 51).15 Intentional consciousness experiences itself as a 
need without response and as a lack that cannot be fulfilled (59–60). 
In confrontation with the reality of violence, traumatism, and suf-
fering, Levinas articulates the ethical address of the self by the other 
that breaks out in that very moment of the real, the very possibility 
of welcoming, hospitality, and justice (TI 27–28). Ethics does not 
bracket and avoid the fixated being it attempts to escape; it engages 
and questions the worldly causal nexus even as it is — as transcendent 
in being interruptive rather than in positing a substance, essence, or 
certainty beyond the world — irreducible to it.
Although comparative philosophy is an uncertain and difficult form 
of inquiry, and poses multiple challenges in the case of Levinas that I 
discuss elsewhere,16 potential points of convergence have emerged: in 
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particular, the emphasis on the priority of the ethical in response to 
worldly suffering and its causal and violent conditions. From the per-
spective of self-reproducing worldly immanence, the ethical appears 
as a means to further ends, such as satisfaction or social order, and dis-
appears under the weight of violence, struggle, and causal conditions. 
A responsibility or responsiveness to the other for her or his own sake 
seems naïvely deluded or intrinsically impossible given the egoism of 
the same and identical, as Levinas might say, or of attachment and 
absorption in the language of Buddhism. Yet as Levinas once asked 
of Rimbaud’s “I as another”: “Is it certain that [it] means only altera-
tion, alienation, betrayal of self, strangeness of self, and servitude to 
that stranger?” (HO 62). If not, then responsibility and altruism lies 
latent in this very condition. It is precisely its violence, traumatism, 
and suffering that calls forth and is thus potentially interrupted by a 
qualitatively different kind of response. It is a response in which the 
ethical is not coercion but the undermining of coercion in welcom-
ing, hospitality, and justice or in loving kindness (mettā), generosity 
(dāna), sympathetic joy (mudita), and compassion (karuṇā).
III. Karma and emPtIness
Given the constant and ethically problematic reification and essen-
tialism of the said, in which one no longer hears or responds ethically 
to the other, one of the strengths of Levinas and Buddhism is that 
they not only serve as sources of fixation and domination, as each say-
ing taken as a said does, but that they can place these — including their 
own self-reification — into question. Levinas does not dismiss skepti-
cism and atheism but praises their ethical moment and takes them 
as the point of departure for the ethical itself and; as Perpich shows, 
skepticism itself enacts the ethical.17 Even as Levinas articulates the 
noncognitive sources of the ethical, he equally emphasizes the role 
of reflection and reason in moral and social-political life. Buddhism, 
most radically in Mādhyamaka and Chan, prioritizes emptiness (Skt. 
sú̄nyatā; Ch. kong, 空), the emptiness of emptiness, and the paradoxi-
cal in relation to the positive practices and theses of Buddhism itself. 
Doing so, it calls attachment, as the prevailing source of delusion and 
suffering, into question.18 This is especially an issue of self-attachment, 
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just as for Levinas ethics primarily concerns one’s own responsibil-
ity for others rather than moralistically judging them. Buddhism not 
only allows for but also calls for and promotes critical self-examina-
tion. It does not eliminate even as it critiques the limitation of words 
and concepts. The moment of conceptual reflection, argument, and 
knowledge is not short-circuited since the Buddha, portrayed in the 
Pāli canon, sees genuine persuasion as requiring experiential verifica-
tion, worldly knowledge, and ethical-meditative self-knowledge.
Buddhist and Levinasian ethics are not religious insofar as religion 
is defined as faith or subjective belief. Levinas explicitly rejects talk of 
faith and mystical experience in favor of the ethical encounter with 
and transcendence toward the other.19 In the canonical portrayal 
of the Buddha, belief is only worthwhile if it is experientially verifi-
able and realizable in this very life through one’s own insight.20 For 
Zongmi Guifeng (宗密圭峰, 780–841), an important Tang Dynasty 
Buddist scholar, wisdom is to know the human, and illumination 
consists in knowing oneself and finding the source or root (本) for 
oneself.21 The awakening of faith is not an end in itself. It should 
open up rather than close off the mindfulness that consists in being 
awakened by and tracelessly responsive to the suchness or as-is-ness 
(Skt. tathātā; Ch. ru, 如) of others and things or “freely manifesting 
oneself in response to things without any bounds.”22
Tathātā is the interdependent uniqueness of particular things 
exhibited in their very unsacred secularity and everyday mundane-
ness, according to the Hongzhou 洪州 school of Chan Buddhism; 
its motto is “ordinary mind is the way” (平常心是道) or “this mind 
is the Buddha” (是心是佛).23 Mazu Daoyi (馬祖道一, 709–788) 
described this ordinary mind as meaning “no intentional creation 
or action, no right or wrong, no grasping or rejecting, no termi-
nable or permanent, no profane or holy. . . . Now all these are just 
the way: walking, abiding, sitting, lying, responding to conditions, 
and handling matters.”24 He continues: “Though the dharma is not 
attached to anything, every phenomenon one has contact with is 
thusness.”25 Hongzhou strategies have been criticized as antinomian 
and ignoring karmic causality since Zongmi, who argues that sponta-
neity (ziran, 自然) provides no basis for ethics and is only justifiable 
through karma.26 Yet these Hongzhou and Linji (臨濟, Jp. Rinzai; 
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d. 866/7) Chan strategies might alternatively suggest the necessity 
of experientially encountering and engaging phenomena, including 
the self. Hongzhou and Linji Chan often challenge convention but 
are not necessarily unethical to the extent that they promote ethical 
spontaneity in encountering beings. This ethics of encounter is found 
in most varieties of Chan, and it challenges the conventions and hier-
archies of prevailing ethical theory, including its anthropocentrism, 
insofar as it includes humans, sentient creatures, and even natural 
phenomena such as mountains and rivers, leaves and dewdrops, asso-
ciated with Dōgen (道元) and the poems of Hanshan (寒山).
Even in radical antinomian and iconoclastic Hongzhou Chan, 
without self-inquiring and self-reflective processes, persuasion 
is — or risks becoming — the manipulation of desires and fears, love 
and hatred. Even if reflection ultimately needs to be transcended in 
Buddhist awakening, its significance in this world and its role on the 
way to that transcendence cannot be denied. The case can thus be 
made that reflection — as a necessary element for morality, medita-
tion, and wisdom — is partly constitutive of that very awakening. As 
recent research into Mādhyamaka and Chan Buddhism indicates, 
concepts and language are necessary for unsettling the sedimenta-
tion of the conceptual and discursive that allows one to forget the 
barriers between self and other and be awakened by all things.27 As 
visible in the skeptical and self-questioning strategies of the Buddha, 
Mādhyamaka, and Chan, Buddhism can involve challenging ordinary 
beliefs, habits, and practices — or a destructuring of reified structures. 
Of course, these three schools of Buddhism are not identical, and 
there are other schools that differ significantly from the account given 
here. Buddhism itself is not one phenomenon or position but a name 
designating a plurality of philosophical and religious approaches. 
Buddhist skeptical strategies employing emptiness do not aim at pro-
ducing a state of doubt or negatively defined nothingness but enact 
an encounter with the phenomena themselves.
The self-manifestation of things is suggestively formulated by 
Dōgen who spoke of the self-blossoming of the world as it is and in its 
suchness, or the liberation and nonabiding of things as an abiding in 
their own phenomenal expression.28 This process of destructuring in 
order to attend to and be mindful of the phenomena themselves — or 
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the suchness of things — is already a primary element in Buddhism. 
However, just as Levinas is challenged by the reification of the said, 
Buddhism continues to face the problem of a belief or structure of 
belief becoming reified such that it disables rather than enables being 
responsive to things and compassionate toward others. This danger 
is apparent in popular conceptions of karma. The remainder of this 
essay challenges such beliefs about karma by returning to the very 
phenomenon that karma was intended to address — namely, the ethi-
cal character of action — in order to open up possibilities for mindful-
ness and awakening.
Iv. Karma as CausalIty, moralIty, and QuestIonaBIlIty
As the principal forms of ordinary Buddhist life are not medita-
tive, but ethical and ritual practices based on beliefs about the causal 
transference of fault and merit, Buddhist karma is commonly inter-
preted as a kind of moral causality in which good actions yield good 
occurrences through merit and bad actions lead to bad occurrences 
through fault.29 In popular Buddhist narratives, good and bad and 
cause and effect are interconnected in the performance of the deed, 
which is causally conditioned by previous deeds, generating future 
conditions of its own.30 The image and ideal of the bodhisattva in 
Mahāyāna Buddhism is of a pure, spontaneous, ethical responsiveness 
to others without conditions or limitations, apparently unconcerned 
with karma or causality, and yet the bodhisattva is invoked precisely 
as a causally efficacious locus of merit that redeems and  perfects 
sentient beings.
Chan Buddhism has been praised and criticized for its supposed 
antinomian and potentially nihilistic overcoming of good and evil 
and right and wrong. The image of a radically free, spontaneous 
awakening is associated with iconoclasm and breaking conventions, 
including those of traditional Buddhism and ordinary morality. This 
image of Chan is already rejected by Zongmi who interprets it as non-
causal and therefore destructive of ethics. He condemns the rheto-
ric of a pure noncausal and nonkarmic spontaneity for what he sees 
as its immoral antinomian consequences in Daoism and Hongzhou 
Chan. Further, Baizhang (百丈) tells of a monk who denied karmic 
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 conditioning but ended up conditioned by it by being reborn for 500 
lives as a fox.31 In a similar story in the Wumenguan (無門關, Gateless 
Barrier), a monk denies that the person of great cultivation falls into 
causality, and even though he believed that he himself was free from 
causal conditioning, he nevertheless remained trapped in it. Baizhang 
awakens him by responding to the question, “Does even a person of 
great cultivation fall into causality, or not?” with the answer, “Such a 
person does not obscure causality.”32
This test-case of Baizhang’s unobscured causality (不昧因果) 
suggests that karma involves a causality that the practitioner should 
neither fall into (and be captured in) nor fall out of (be exempt 
from) by forgetting or ignoring it.33 One interpretation of Buddhist 
 awakening — the one suggested in this essay based on an admittedly 
Chan Buddhist reading of some Buddhist texts and traditions — is that 
it is not a complete or otherworldly transcendence that leaves causal-
ity, morality, and the world behind. Instead, awakening is immanent 
and relational to cause and effect, if it is not to be the illusory freedom 
of causal indifference. Such spontaneity, whether it is conceived more 
or less ethically, cannot bracket or negate the worldly causal and ethi-
cal interdependence of self and other but is achieved through it.
v. Karma and sufferIng
In the normative portrait of the Buddha, it is precisely being affected 
by the other’s suffering — the disquiet, sickness, old age, and death 
of others — that set him on the path of awakening.34 This encounter 
with and uncalculated response to suffering provided the basis for 
karma becoming ethical and the universe becoming a basically moral 
arena in early Buddhism.35 Karma is therefore not a destiny or fatality 
that justifies suffering but instead opens up the possibility of con-
fronting and responding to the reality of the other’s suffering.
The first Noble Truth states that life involves suffering, un- or 
dis-ease (dukkha). This is not an invitation to stoically or religiously 
accept suffering as necessary or justified because it is natural or divinely 
ordained. The significance of the first truth of suffering is found in the 
three additional Noble Truths that constitute a response to the reality 
of suffering. These show that suffering has its causes and  conditions, 
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such that it is not an incomprehensible and unquestionable destiny, 
and that one can respond to these through the cultivation of the 
Eightfold Path. If there is such a path, and if there is awakening, then 
suffering is the ordinary but not inevitable condition of things.
The Buddha’s discourses did not inadequately answer the prob-
lematic of theodicy, since karma was never a reply to the issue of 
reconciling God’s goodness with worldly suffering and evil. The 
question that karma responds to is, “How am I a being that is both 
conditioned and capable of acting otherwise, or how can I respond 
to my own and others’ suffering?” Theodicy is conceptually necessary 
to any monotheism that wants to explain why God created a world 
full of suffering and evil, much as when Job’s friends explain how his 
suffering must be due to previous wrongs. However, karma is not ful-
filled in resignation but in responding to the suffering of the world, 
oneself and others, with compassion, mindfulness, and wisdom. It is 
significant that Levinas unfolds a conception of monotheism as inher-
ently ethical through the example of Job, who does not resort to the 
theodicy-like explanations of his friends. On this conception, mono-
theism is not a sacrificial ideology, and good is the interruption of 
and break with evil.36 God indicates the good that humans constantly 
betray by how they behave toward each other. It is then not a ques-
tion only of the betrayal of the good but “awareness of its status as 
betrayal.”37 “Everything shows itself at the price of this betrayal, even 
the unsayable” such that goodness — the relation with the other — is 
inevitably a risk (BPW 7, 113).
In Chan Buddhism, as in the Daoism of the Zhuangzi, “the inter-
play of skill (qiao) (technical action) and clumsiness (zhuo)” consti-
tutes human life.38 The iconoclastic betrayal of the Buddha and the 
Dharma in Hongzhou and Linji Chan is the clumsy and off-putting 
yet skillful realization of the way.39 For Levinas, it is the struggle of 
the ethical in its very betrayal and impossibility that constitutes an 
ethical humanity. Language’s fragility is equally the possibility of its 
ethical saying, which occurs in response to being and what is other-
wise than being.40 It is an awareness of its impossibility in that it is 
inevitably complicated and betrayed in its being said and enacted. 
“And yet,” Levinas writes, “in its separation from the work and in 
99-114_KALMANSON ET AL_F8.indd   110 8/23/2013   7:41:08 PM
© 
20
13
 D
uq
ue
sn
e U
niv
ers
ity
 P
res
s
The Complicity of the Ethical 111
the possible betrayal that threatens it in the course of its very exercise, 
the will becomes aware of this” (TI 231). There is no ethics without 
violence, without betrayal, as Jacques Derrida insists in his reading 
of Levinas.41
Ethics is impossible as theodicy, but is there an ethics of karma? 
Instead of justifying and thus potentially excusing evil, as Levinas 
warns about theodicy in relation to the excess of suffering and evil, 
karma concerns the practical qualities of intentional action such as 
appropriateness and inappropriateness, skillfulness and unskillfulness, 
wholesomeness and unwholesomeness. Given these characteristics, it 
is an ethical or moral question that is answered by the ethical way 
of life formulated in the Eightfold Path. The question that karma 
addresses is, “What way of life is most choice-worthy given the reality 
of my own and others’ suffering?”
Karma does not preclude transformative action, if it is a question 
that I pose to myself about “what ought to be done?” Am I account-
able or responsible for my situation beyond my immediate intention? 
How should I respond to my situation? Should I continue to act as 
I have done or should I act otherwise? Although these questions are 
often posed and answered in the mode of self-interest and general 
happiness, that is, in terms of fruits and results, they reveal a more 
fundamental responsibility: I am responsible not only for what I do 
and why I do it but for the other as well. Although one might doubt 
the notion of collective karma, it is nevertheless the case that karma 
binds selves together in relations and networks of interdependence 
and responsibility. This moral sense of karma is not only a schol-
arly (as opposed to a popular) concern. The notion of rebirth in Sri 
Lankan popular Buddhism only deepens one’s sense of responsibility 
for others and the social character of karma. My relations with oth-
ers are unavoidable, given that I am bound to them not only in this 
life but in other lives as well.42 The suffering that I ignore today, if I 
believe the other person deserves that suffering because of past deeds, 
will become part of my own suffering. In this context, the Buddha’s 
appeal to self-interested happiness as a motive for morality43 does not 
conclude but begins an awakening that transcends both meritori-
ous and detrimental attachments, pleasure and pain, as well as the 
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 happiness born of the detachment cultivated in the earlier stages of 
meditative practice (the jhānas).44 Even if such self-interested  concern 
were true of the arhat (the perfected person), the bodhisattva’s infi-
nite and spontaneous responsiveness to “the unequalled agony of 
every single being”45 transcends self-interested redemption.
This transition from acting for the sake of oneself (one’s own hap-
piness) to acting for the sake of the other (the happiness of all sentient 
beings) suggests that a Buddhist notion of responsibility cannot be 
based in the egoism of self-interest or in the commands of obligation. 
Śāntideva (c. 685–763) remarked how one is praised for the merit of 
returning a favor. Such doing of good reflects the logic of exchange 
that informs ordinary thinking about self-interest and obligation. He 
then asks, “What, then, can be said of the Bodhisattva who does good 
without obligation?”46 It might be argued that this absence of obliga-
tion implies an absence of responsibility, especially if one believes that 
responsibility signifies acting from a debt according to a sacrificial 
logic of command and exchange. However, might not the thought of 
a responsibility without obligation reflect an alternative way of think-
ing about the ethical rather than simply being immoral?
If the highest sense of the ethical is acting spontaneously — or 
purely passively in Levinas’s language — for the sake of others, for 
all sentient beings and the entirety of things regardless of reward 
or punishment, then responsibility fulfills itself as the unforced and 
spontaneous freedom of the gift, of a giving without support or foun-
dation. On giving without conditions, or charity without reliance on 
attachments and appearances, see the references to giving without 
the support of signs or qualities in the Diamond Sutra.47 This gen-
erosity is effortless and spontaneous (for its own sake), since it is no 
longer concerned with merit or reward.48 The spontaneity of giv-
ing, according to Dōgen, is appropriately the first of the perfections 
(pāramitā) because nothing more thoroughly transforms the mind.49 
Such pure action is not characterized by calculation of interests or 
expectations about the reciprocity of exchange, nor by withdrawal 
from the world.50 It is effortless and at ease in confronting the world 
from within the world and thus not absorbed in its calculative pru-
dence and exchange, which abandons the ethical while claiming to be 
in good conscience.
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vI. ConClusIon
Buddhist ethics, as karmic, dependently originated, and causal, is 
not purely normative. Karma cannot be understood according to the 
duality of ought and is, or as a natural, worldly causal determinism in 
contrast to a moral causality of freedom, as in Kantian autonomy and 
responsibility. Neither should it be construed as metaphysically or 
naturalistically neutral. The phenomenon that karma addresses is pri-
marily the impermanent self-awakening to responsibility for what one 
does and does not do, that is, how the self interdependently exists in 
relation and response to itself, others, and the world without fixating 
either identity or difference.
Self-responsibility through karma is realized and overcome as a 
natural and effortless receptiveness to things — especially the spon-
taneous and uncoerced compassion in response to the actual suffer-
ing of others — that characterizes the Buddhas and bodhisattvas. It is 
important to distinguish such responsiveness from Western concep-
tions of accountability and guilt, which presuppose the constant iden-
tity of the agent. If karma does not apply to an isolated substantial 
self, then the individual is engaged in its actions and transformations, 
and is deeply responsible for what happens to others.
Not without affinities to Levinas, Buddhist ethics begins with self-
interest, desire, and one’s own place in the sun, but does not con-
clude with these. For Levinas, life and death stand in the tension of 
betrayal. Even as death threatens the betrayal of life, mere life is not 
only the betrayal of death as escape but also life’s promise of happi-
ness.51 Without such passivity, dependence, and complicity, another 
distinct form of complicity — responsibility — would not be possible. 
There is not only complicity and betrayal but also the betrayal of 
betrayal on the failure of power: “But the violence of the sword lets 
the will it seeks to dominate escape. True violence conserves the free-
dom it coerces” (CPP 39).
The betrayal of betrayal is another kind of complicity, that of prox-
imity and contact: “a complicity or alliance ‘for nothing,’ without 
content” or “a complicity for nothing, a fraternity, a proximity that is 
possible only as an openness” (CPP 121; OB 150). Goodness exists in 
the face of everyday life and its mechanical impersonality and  senseless 
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suffering, even in the smallest expressions of kindness: “an interjec-
tion, a form of expression as undifferentiated as a wink, a sign to one’s 
neighbor! A sign of what? Of life, of goodwill? Of complicity?” (PN 
40). In the facticity of suffering and the ambiguity of complicity, there 
continue to be possibilities for transformation and transcendence 
toward the good beyond being within being — the realm of violence, 
suffering, and saṃsāra — itself.52 It is our perpetual complicity in the 
unethical facticity of everyday life that magnifies the ethical import 
of our smallest actions, such that the tiniest acts of kindness begin to 
undo the totalizing instrumental economics of exchange.
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